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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

PETITION FOR WRIT
OF CERTIORARI

WILFORD H. HANSEN STONE
QUARRIES, INC., a Utah
corporation, SHARRON KILLION
JAMES T. JENSEN, JERRY J. JENSEN,
DIX JENSEN, and all other persons
unknown, claiming any right,
title, estate or interest in, or
lien upon the real property
described in the pleading adverse
to the plaintiff's ownership, or
clouding its title thereto,

Case No.

Defendants and Appellees.
Plaintiff

and

appellant,

The

Salt

Lake

Investment

Company, a Utah Corporation, (hereinafter "plaintiff") respectfully
petitions this Honorable Court for Writ of Certiorari to review the
decision of the Court of Appeals in this matter.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Does a dissolved corporation retain its corporate

existence and powers for the purpose of protecting and disposing of
its assets, including standing to sue to quiet title to real
property owned by it?

Is it for the same reasons subject to being

sued regarding title to said assets?
2. If a dissolved corporation has such a right and still
holds title to mining claims is it conclusively barred from
protecting those claims (by suit or otherwise) by lapse of some

period of time or because its Articles of Dissolution mistakenly
stated that it had disposed of its assets when in fact it still
held title to 3 mining claims?
REFERENCE TO COURT OF APPEALS OPINION:
302 Utah Adv Rep 56, 927 P2d 200.
CONCISE STATEMENT OF GROUNDS ON WHICH JURISDICTION
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH IS INVOKED
A.

The opinion of the Court of Appeals for which

defendant seeks review was filed October 31, 1996.
B.

Petition for Rehearing was filed November 14, 1996.

C.

Order denying Petition for Rehearing was entered

January 10, 1997.
D.

Statutory provision conferring jurisdiction on the

Supreme Court to review the decision of the Court of Appeals by
Writ of Certiorari:

Section 78-2-2(3) (a) and

(5) Utah Code

Annotated and 78-2a-4, Utah Code Annotated, and Title VII, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES. ORDINANCES
AND REGULATIONS
A. Amendment XIV, Section 1, United States Constitution
B. Constitution of Utah, Art. I, Sections 7, 11, and 22.
C.

Section 16-10-101 UCA.

(Repealed 1992)

D.

Sections 16-10a-1405 and 1701 UCA

(Pertinent text of said citations is set forth in the Appendix)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE,

This is an action by plaintiff

seeking to quiet title to three tracts of real property situated in
Utah County. (R. 5)
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. After defendants were served with
summons and complaint, defendant, Wilford H. Hansen Stone Quarries,
Inc., a Utah corporation (hereafter "Corporate Defendant"), and
defendant,

Sharron

Killion

(hereinafter

"Killion"),

filed

a

Corrected Answer, Counterclaim and Cross-claim. (R. 89) Plaintiff
filed

a

Amended

Reply

to

said

Counterclaim

(R.

114), and

defendants, James T. Jensen, Jerry J. Jensen and Dix Jensen
(hereinafter "Jensens") filed an answer to said cross-claim. (R.
107)

The Jensens did not answer plaintiff's complaint, but filed

a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b), URCP, or in the Alternative
for Summary Judgment. (R. 9)
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT.

The lower court treated

the motion as one for summary judgment and granted the same with
prejudice.

(R. 162, 184)

Timely Motion to Alter and Amend

Judgment was served and filed by plaintiff, but was denied. (R.
232)

The Counterclaim of the Corporate Defendant and Killion was

dismissed with prejudice.

(R. 254)

The cross-claim of said

defendants against the Jensens was dismissed without prejudice. (R
254).

Notice of Appeal was filed on July 7, 1995 (R.238), and an

Amended Notice of Appeal was filed October 4, 1995 (R. 256), after
the

lower

court

entered

its

"Supplemental

Dismissal of All Claims" on September 29, 1995.
-3-

Order

Confirming

(R. 254) Court of

Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court in an opinion
written by Judge Norman H. Jackson and concurred in by Judge Judith
M. Billings.
only.

Judge Pamela T. Greenwood concurred in the result

Petition for Rehearing was denied by the Court of Appeals.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Plaintiff filed a complaint in the lower court to

quiet title to three tracts of real property

(mining claims)

situated in Utah County. The Jensens are involved with only one of
the tracts, and the other defendants are involved in all three of
them.

(R. 5)
B.

The Jensens filed a Motion to Dismiss under Rule

12(b), URCP, or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment, alleging
that plaintiff corporation had been dissolved and therefore had no
standing to sue to quiet title to said properties.
C.

(R. 8)

The Corporate Defendant and Killion

answered

plaintiff/s complaint on the merits and filed a Counterclaim
against plaintiff and a cross-Claim against the Jensens (R. 89) .
Plaintiff filed a Reply to said Counterclaim

(R. 110) and the

Jensens filed an answer to the cross-claim. (R.107)
D.

Defendants filed no affidavits, but several were

filed on behalf of plaintiff.

The Jensens and plaintiff filed

certified copies of documents tending to show that some of the
statutory steps for dissolution of plaintiff corporation had been
undertaken.

(R. 36 and 40) The Jensens filed a Certificate of the

Utah Division of Corporations stating that plaintiff corporation
-4-

had been dissolved, (R. 41) Plaintiff however filed a Certificate
of Search of the Utah Division of Corporations certifying that
Certificate of Dissolution could not be found.
E.

(R. 154)

The Jensens never filed an answer to plaintiff's

complaint and no discovery was undertaken, completed, or allowed.
F.

The lower court granted the Motion for Summary

Judgment of the Jensens and dismissed the plaintiff's complaint in
its entirety and with prejudice as to the Jensens and also as to
all other defendants in this action.

(R. 162, 184)

The lower

court's order is based upon the following reasoning: " . . . Salt
Lake Investment Company was a corporation that was dissolved in
1965, and that said corporation therefore lacks standing to sue or
be sued in Utah courts."
G.

The lower court's Order granting summary judgment

did not deal with the merits of the quiet title action.

(R. 162,

184)
H.
motion

for

Although requested (R. 46) , oral argument on the
summary

judgment was denied

plaintiff's opposition was "frivolous".

on the

grounds that

(R. 162, 159)

Although

requested, oral argument on the plaintiff's motion to alter and
amend was also not allowed.

(R. 232)
ARGUMENT

POINT I.

THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS IN

CONFLICT WITH DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The Court of Appeals has ruled that plaintiff has no
-5-

standing to sue to protect its assets. This conclusion appears to
be clearly contrary to the holdings of the Supreme Court in at
least two decisions interpreting the applicable Utah statute.
The statutory provision in effect between 1961 and 1992
was found at Section 16-10-101, UCA, and provided as follows:
"Notwithstanding the dissolution of a corporation either
(1) by the issuance of a certificate of dissolution by
the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code, or (2)
by a decree of court, or (3) by expiration of its period
of duration, the corporate existence of such corporation
shall nevertheless continue for the purpose of winding up
its affairs in respect to any property and assets which
have not been distributed or otherwise disposed of prior
to such dissolution, and to effect such purpose such
corporation may sell or otherwise dispose of such
property and assets, sue and be sued, contract, and
exercise all other incidental and necessary powers."
(Emphasis added.)
(It should be noted that prior to 1984 the Secretary of State
was referred to rather than the Division of Corporations and
Commercial Code.

Prior to 1961 the substance of said Section was

found in Section 16-1-2, UCA, and in substantially that form has
been a part of our law in Utah since at least 1898.)
In Falconaero Enterprise, Inc. v. Valley

Investment

Company, 16 Utah 2d 77, 395 P2d 915 (1964), the Supreme Court
upholds the clear meaning of said Section 101 where the court
states at page 915:
"Next, it is asserted that because of a dissolution of
the plaintiff corporation, it had no standing in court,
which seems to be answered by Title 16-10-100, 16-10-101,
Utah Code Annotated 1953."
Although the case of McKay & Knobel Enter. , Inc. v. Teton
-6-

Van Gas, Inc. , 23 Utah 2d 200, 460 P2d 828 (1969), dealt with a
corporate suspension, it found that the law relating to dissolution
was "instructive" and the court speaking through Justice Crockett
referred to said Section 16-10-101 and said Section 16-1-;? and
stated in connection therewith:
"We accept the fact that there are good and sufficient
reasons for this declared policy of the law that a
corporation, even though dissolved, is able to sue and
protect its assets. This enables it to better discharge
the duties the law imposes upon it: to pay its taxes;
to pay its creditors;
to meet its obligations to
stockholders who have invested in it. If in the process
of *winding up its affairs' the supposedly xinsolvent'
corporation should manage to salvage sufficient assets to
revive and continue its life, it is only reasonable to
suppose that it would have as much right to sue and
conserve them as if it had proved to be completely
defunct." (Emphasis added.)
The court then *unt on to say that:
"The considerations set forth above as to why a dissolved
corporation, whose life has thus presumably been
terminated, should be able to protect its assets, would
seem to apply for even stronger reasons to a corporation
which has merely been * suspended.'"
Although these decisions were cited to the Court of
Appeals there were entirely ignored, and the opinion of the Court
of Appeals makes no reference to them.
The crystal clear meaning of the foregoing statute as
interpreted by the foregoing Utah cases is that a dissolved
corporation retains its corporate existence for the purpose of
protecting its assets. The law as thus enacted by the legislature
and interpreted by this court, is made even more clea

in the

current version of the said statute enacted in 1992 which is found
-7-

at Section 16-10a-1405, UCA, and which states as follows:
11

(1)
A dissolved corporation continues its corporate
existence but may not carry on any business except that appropriate
to wind U P and liquidate its business and affairs, including:
(a) collecting its assets;
(b) disposing of its properties that will not be
distributed in kind to its shareholders;
(c) discharging or making provision for discharging its
liabilities;
(d)
distributing its remaining property among its
shareholders according to their interest; and
(e)
doing every other act necessary to wind up and
liquidate its business and affairs.
" (2)

Dissolution of a corporation does not:
(a) transfer title to the corporation's property;
(b)
prevent transfer of its shares or securities,
although the authorization to dissolve may provide for closing the
corporation's share transfer records;
(c) subject its directors or officers to standards of
conduct different from those prescribed in Part 8;
(d) change:
(i) quorum or voting requirements of its board of
directors or shareholders;
(ii) provisions for selection, resignation, or
removal of its directors or officers or both; or
(iii) provisions for amending its bylaws or its
articles of incorporation;
(e) prevent commencement of a proceeding by or against
the corporation in its corporate name;
(f) abate or suspend a proceeding pending by or against
the corporation on the effective date of dissolution; or
(g) terminate the authority of the registered agent of
the corporation." (Emphasis added.)
Pursuant

to

Section

16-10a-1701

UCA,

the

aforesaid

Section 16-10a-1405 UCA applies to all corporations in "existence"
at the time of the passage of thereof

(1992) , therefore since

plaintiff is in existence for the purpose of protecting its assets
then

Section

16-10a-1405

UCA

applies

to

plaintiff

in

this

action.
The decisions of this court are in accord with decisions
-8-

of other courts.

For example, in Screwmen's Benev. Assn. of

Louisiana v. Monteleone. 168 Louisiana 664, 122 Southern 116
(1929), the Supreme Court of Louisiana held at pages 117 and 118:
"When once a legal and valid existent corporation becomes
the owner of property, such property remains the property
of the corporation until disposed of in a manner provided
by the charter or by the law.
"Neither the stockholders of a stock corporation nor the
members of a non-stock corporation ever become the owners
in common of the property of such corporations. .
"The same is true with respect to a corporation whose
charter has expired, has been forfeited, or for any other
cause has been dissolved.
"Therefore, the property here involved continued to be
the property of the corporation, separate and distinct
from the members, and will remain so until disposed of or
transferee in some manner provided by law."
In the lower court, plaintiff disputed that it had been
dissolved, but argued that even if it was dissolved, it still had
the right to protect its assets.

This case does not involve a

situation where after dissolution plaintiff acquired mining claims
which because of dissolution it had no business acquiring. In this
case the subject mining claims have been the property of plaintiff
since before dissolution, but they were overlooked, and they have
never been conveyed out of the plaintiff corporation.

The result

of the decision of the Court of Appeals is that plaintiff cannot
protect those assets in court.

The reason:! ng of the Court of

Appeals in reaching this decision appears to have been that the
dissolution papers of the plaintiff indicate that plaintiff has
-9-

disposed of its assets, and therefore the plaintiff corporation has
wound up its affairs, and since Section 16-10-101 is limited to
"winding up" and since winding up is completed (simply because the
articles of dissolution erroneously say it was), plaintiff cannot
avail itself of the benefit of the statute.

The Court of Appeals

therefor holds that because of an error in the dissolution papers,
plaintiff's assets are in effect forfeited, at least it appears
inevitable that that which cannot be protected is in effect lost.
Section 16-10-101 of course contemplates that winding up is a
process that occurs after the dissolution papers are filed.

That

statute says: that the corporate existence continues for the
purpose of winding up its affairs "in respect to any property and
assets which have not been distributed or otherwise disposed of
prior to such dissolution."

The filing of the articles of

dissolution is not the end; it is nothing more than the beginning
of the winding up phase, and plaintiff should not be barred by an
innocent mistake made prior to winding up. It must be evident that
winding up is not a time-driven concept. It is only intended to be
descriptive of the situation that exists where the dissolved
corporation still has original assets that it has not disposed of,
and if it still has such, it is by definition still winding up.
On the one hand, the opinion of the Court of Appeals
seems to hold that plaintiff has no winding up period after
dissolution because of the erroneous statement in the articles of
dissolution that it had disposed of its assets. On the other hand
-10-

the lower court held that "30 years i s far beyond a reasonable time
to wind-up" and the Court of Appeals states that "We therefore
conclude the trial court correctly ruled that because SLI's
winding-up period was over it row Id no longer sue or be sued ," so
a time element appears to have been introduced into winding up
which

is unnecessary

mischief.

and will create untold

and unnecessary

1 t does i lot matter if the1 f1 nine i,v Long ur short.

The

fact that there is a time element destroys any certainty in the law
relating to dissolved corporations.

No one will know with any

assurance whether the winding \ lp peri od i n a given case is "over."
A law suit will be necessary to determine that in every case.

No

one can know with any assurance who is in control and who they can
safely deal with.
There is no reason for a time limitation on winding up.
If the officers of the company take too long in winding up, it is
presumably the shareholders who are injured,

But how are the

shareholders helped if the corporation is stripped of its assets
because it does not wind up fast enough? How are the shareholders
helped if they are precluded from suing the corporation, as they
are under the decision of the Court of Appeals. If the court wants
to speed up the process of winding up, it should not do so at the
expense of the very shareholders who are presumably supposed to be
the beneficiaries of that speed.

If "stripping" is what the court

has in mi nd, :i t on] y helps speculators and. prof iteers. Sure] y this
court cannot countenance such a result.
-11-

If plaintiff cannot protect its assets in court, then one
of the following must follow: (1) the assets of the dissolved
corporation are in effect forfeited because of the inability of the
corporation to protect them, (2) the corporation can still convey
its assets even though it cannot sue to protect them, or (3) the
assets pass to the shareholders by operation of law making a
lawsuit unnecessary.
As

to

(1)

"forfeiture," such

a

result

is

totally

unacceptable and should not be permitted by this court. It clearly
violates federal due process and equal protection, Amendment XIV,
Section 1, United States Constitution, and State due process as
well as the related State open courts provision and provision
against taking without just compensation, Constitution of Utah,
Article I, Sections 7, 11 and 22.
As to (2) "conveyance by the corporation," it is true
that both Section 16-10-101 and Section 16-10a-1405 allow the
dissolved corporation to dispose of its assets during winding up,
so presumably it can deed its property to its shareholders or to
third parties, but the same statutes also allow it to sue during
winding up, so if under the opinion of the Court of Appeals,
plaintiff cannot sue because winding up is complete, why can it
convey its title because the same winding up is complete?

If the

acts described in said sections can only be done during the winding
up period, and if the winding up period is over (whether at the
time of the filing of the dissolution papers or later) , then
-12-

plaintiff

is presumably

unable to convey title to the subject

claims to its shareholders just as it is unable to sue and be sued.
Certainly the other claimants to the subject claims will cite the
opinion of the Court

i Appeals

in this case t.o that effect, ami at

the least further appeals will be necessary to clarify that issue.
As to (3) "assets passing by operation of law to the
sharehoIders," both Secti on 16-10-101 and 2 6-1 0a-1 405 establish
that the assets do not so pass. A holding by this court that they
do so pass, although better than forfeiture, would create numerous
problems and the more shareholders in the dissolved corporation the
bigger the problems.

We are aware of a dissolved mining company

with 700 shareholders holding in excess of 350 acres of valuable
mining claims. It seems inconceivable that a court would hold that
the title

r

> those claims passes by operation of law to the

shareholders so as to create a situati on where 700 shareholders
hold as tenants in common.

It would be a nightmare creating among

others the following problems:
1.

At what poi nt does title pass?

specified number of years later?

At dissolution?

A "reasonable" time later?

criteria determine a "reasonable" time?

A

What

When can a third party

safely deal with the corporate on a nd wl: in an must it deal with the
shareholders?
2. Does the transfer of stock in a dissolved corporation
carry with it the real estate, or after dissoli ltioi I does the real
estate vest in the stockholder, so that transfer of his stock does
-13-

not carry with it his interest in the real estate?
3.

If the transfer of the shares does carry with it the

shareholders vested undivided interest in the real estate, then
what problems have we created by allowing real estate to be
transferred without a deed? Voluntary transfer without a deed has
not heretofore been allowed, so how can it be wise or prudent to
allow it now?
The holdings of this court in Falcanaero and McKay &
Knobel were correct, and the Supreme Court should grant certiorari
to

correct

the opinion of the Court of Appeals to

conform

therewith.
POINT II.
PLAINTIFF

OF

DUE

THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPRIVES
PROCESS

AND

EQUAL

PROTECTION

AND

RELATED

CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS, LEAVES PLAINTIFF AS OWNER OF REAL
PROPERTY WITHOUT ANY RIGHT TO PROTECT ITS ASSETS, AND THE COURT OF
APPEALS HAS THEREBY SO FAR DEPARTED FROM ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE
OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS TO REQUIRE THE SUPERVISION OF THE
SUPREME COURT.
Not only has the opinion of the Court of Appeals left
plaintiff with no remedy, but the said opinion contradicts itself
with respect to plaintiff's claim to title, and leaves those who
deal with such claims very much in the dark. The Court of Appeals
on page three of its opinion states that:
"SLI [plaintiff] has not disputed the accuracy of its articles of
dissolution which read in pertinent part:
-14-

"FOURTH:
All remaining property and assets of the
corporation have been distributed among its
shareholders, in accordance with their respective
rights and interests."
We

take

this

to mean that

since

the

articles

of

dissolution state that plaintiff has disposed of its assets and
since plaintiff (according to said opinion) does not dispute that
statement in the articles of dissolution that therefore plaintiff
has no title.

That conclusion is totally incomprehensible.

This

whole lawsuit disputes the accuracy of that statement and of the
articles

themselves.

Plaintiff

has

title

to

t.he property.

Plaintiff so claims in its complaint, and on summary judgment that
must be conceded to plaintiff. Furthermore, that is clear because
all of the defendants ha v e tried

t o obtain

that

title

1 rom

plaintiff.
In contradiction to the foregoing, at note 4 of the Court
of Appeals opinion, the Court of Appeals states:
"SLI [plaintiff] worries about the disposition of
property in this and similar cases in which a dissolved
corporation may remain in the uncertain chain of title,
yet has no standing to resolve that issue.
However
compelling that question may be, it is not before us at
this time. Our narrow holding is that, in this case, SLI
has no standing to sue to quiet title to the mining
claims involved.
Other corporations and individuals
concerned about the title to the claims here must simply
pursue their own remedies, supported by whatever other
legal theories may apply."
That statement appears to concede that plaintiff is in
the chain of title, which we take to mean that plaintiff has title,
-15-

but the Court of Appeals expressly holds that plaintiff cannot
protect its title in court.

The Court of Appeals thus appears to

say first that plaintiff has not title, but later acknowledges that
it does but that it cannot do anything about it.

Such a result

clearly calls for the intervention of this court, because the Court
of Appeals is correct in stating that this is a "compelling
question."

How the Court of Appeals can claim that said issue is

not before it is incomprehensible.

The question was squarely

before the Court of Appeals. It is now squarely before this court.
Section 16-10-101 and Section 16-10a-1405 make it abundantly clear
that plaintiff retains its title to the subject mining claims and
that they have not passed by operation of law to the shareholders.
Although

the

Court

of Appeals

suggests

that

the

individual

shareholders of plaintiff can somehow pursue a "remedy" by whatever
"legal theories may apply," under the court's opinion this cannot
involve court action by or against the title holder, because
according to the decision of the Court of Appeals, plaintiff cannot
sue or be sued, and as we have noted, although it is true that both
Section 16-10-101 and Section 16-10a-1405 allow the dissolved
corporation to dispose of its assets, so presumably it can deed its
property to its shareholders or to third parties (and this may be
what the Court of Appeals has in mind) , but the same statutes also
allow it to sue and be sued, so if under the opinion of the Court
of Appeals plaintiff cannot sue why can it convey its title?

If

the acts described in said sections can only be done during the
-16-

winding

up period, and

plaintiff

if the winding up period

is over, then

is presumably unable to convey title to the subject

claims to its shareholders just as it is unable to sue and be sued.
The opinion of the cour t clouds any action which the corporation
may take.

If there is some policy reason why the corporation

cannot sue but can convey its property (in other words winding up
is over for purposes of lawsuits but winding up is not over for
purposes of a conveyance) then the opinion should be modified to so
state.

If the plaintiff now attempts to convey the title to the

shareholders

or

third

parties,

then

this

action

will

almost

certainly be met with the argument that the winding up is over and
that: th is precludes a conveyance just as i t precludes a. 1 .awsuit.
This important matter should not be left up in the air.

The

opinion of the Court of Appeals instead of solving anything, has
simply clouded the title even further, ai id i s an open i nvitation to
endless litigation in this and other cases.
This decision of the Court of Appeals deprives plaintiff
of due process and equal protection and is in violation of the open
courts

provision

constitutional

of

the

Utah

Constitution

provision against unlawful

and

of

the

seizures, and

Utah
leaves

plaintiff without any right to protect its property, and the Court
of Appeals in so holding has so far departed from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings as to require the supervision
of the Supreme Court.
Constitution;

(Amendment XIV, Section 1, United States

Constitution of Utah, Art. I, Sections 7, 11, and
-17-

22.)
POINT III.

IN ANY EVENT, THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS

DECIDED AN IMPORTANT QUESTION OF STATE LAW WHICH SHOULD BE SETTLED
BY THE SUPREME COURT.
Even if the decision of the Court of Appeals were not in
conflict with the opinions of this court in Falcanaero and McKay &
Knobel, the determination of whether a dissolved corporation can
protect its assets or whether it loses its right to do so after a
certain period of time or otherwise, should be settled by the
Supreme Court.

Dissolved corporations hold the title to numerous

properties in this state, particularly mining claims.

Some of

these claims still have significant importance for mining. Others
are now very valuable because of the surface rights - this is
particularly so in locations such as the Wasatch Mountains.

This

important matter deserves a far more thorough treatment than the
Court of Appeals gave it, and should be settled by this court.
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals decision
has created more problems that it has solved.

It will be an

unending source of confusion and will involve numerous parties and
the courts in needless litigation for years to come. Decisions of
appellate courts should, where possible, have the opposite result.
They should enlighten and clarify.
obscure.

They should not confuse and

These issues need to be resolved by this court.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons plaintiff respectfully requests
-18-

that the Supreme Court grant its Writ of Certiorari herein,
DATED the

day of February, 1997.
Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT C. CUMMINGS
MICHAEL D. CUMMINGS
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant
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Two copies of the foregoing Petition for Certiorari were
mailed to each of the following at the address shown, postage
prepaid, the

day of February, 1997:
Derek Langton
Attorney for Defendants Jensen
201 South Main, Suite 1800
P. 0. Box 45898
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898
Wilford N. Hansen, Jr.
Attorney for the Corporate Defendant and Killion,
Mountain Fuel East Professional Plaza
1172 East Highway 6, Suite 7
P. 0. Box 67
Payson, Utah 84651-0067.

Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant
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APPENDIX
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS,
ORDINANCES AND REGULATIONS from Page 2:

STATUTES,

A. Amendment XIV, Section 1, United States Constitution
B. Constitution of Utah, Article I, Sections 7, 11, and
22.
C.

Section 16-10-101 UCA. (Repealed 1992)

D.

Sections 16-10a-1405 and 1701 UCA
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Opinion of the Court of Appeals
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Order (denying petition for rehearing)
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Ruling (on motion for summary judgment)

4.

Order Granting Jensen Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment
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Ruling

(on motion to alter and amend)

6.

Supplemental Order

7.
8.

Complaint
Motion to Dismiss, or Alternately
for Summary Judgment
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184
232
254
5
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CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES
AND REGULATIONS:

Amendment XIV, Section 1, United States Constitution:
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 7:
"No person shall be deprived of life,
property, without due process of law."

liberty

or

Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 11:
"All courts shall be open, and every person, for an
injury done to him in his person, property or reputation,
shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending
before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel,
any civil cause to which he is a party."

Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 22:
"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for
public use without just compensation."

Section 16-10-101 UCA (Repealed 1992):
Notwithstanding the dissolution of a corporation either
(1) by the issuance of a certificate of dissolution by
the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code, or (2)
by a decree of court, or (3) by expiration of its period
2

of duration, the corporate existence of such corporation
shall nevertheless continue for the purpose of winding up
its affairs in respect to any property and assets which
have not been distributed or otherwise disposed of prior
to such dissolution, and to effect such purpose such
corporation may sell or otherwise dispose of such
property and assets, sue and be sued, contract, and
exercise all other incidental and necessary powers.
Section 16-10a-1405 UCA:
(1) A dissolved corporation continues its corporate existence
but may not carry on any business except that appropriate to wind
up and liquidate its business and affairs, including:
(a) collecting its assets;
(b) disposing of its properties that will not be
distributed in kind to its shareholders;
(c) discharging or making provision for discharging its
liabilities;
(d)
distributing its remaining property among its
shareholders according to their interest; and
(e)
doing every other act necessary to wind up and
liquidate its business and affairs.
(2)

Dissolution of a corporation does not:
(a) transfer title to the corporations property;
(b)
prevent transfer of its shares or securities,
although the authorization to dissolve may provide for closing the
corporation's share transfer records;
(c) subject its directors or officers to standards of
conduct different from those prescribed in Part 8;
(d) change:
(i) quorum or voting requirements of its board of
directors or shareholders;
(ii) provisions for selection, resignation, or
removal of its directors or officers or both; or
(iii) provisions for amending its bylaws or its
articles of incorporation;
(e) prevent commencement of a proceeding by or against
the corporation in its corporate name;
(f) abate or suspend a proceeding pending by or against
the corporation on the effective date of dissolution; or
(g) terminate the authority of the registered agent of
the corporation.
Section 16-10a-1701 UCA:
"Except as otherwise provided in Section 16-10a-1704,
this chapter applies to all domestic corporations in
existence on July 1, 1992, that were incorporated under
any general statute of this state providing for
incorporation of corporations for profit, and to actions

3

taken by the directors, officers, and shareholders of
such corporations after July 1, 1992."
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lant has failed to provide adequate legal analysis and legal authority in support of his
claims, appellant's assertions do not permit
appellate review.

dissolved and had finished winding up its
affairs.
Affirmed.
Greenwood, J., concurred in result only.

CONCLUSION
Lawrence's appellate brief fails to conform
to the requirements of Rule 24 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure. We therefore
decline to address Lawrence's claims on appeal and affirm the trial court's rulings.
WILKINS, J., concurs.
ORME, P.J., concurs in result only.

(o
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Corporations <®=>630(1)
Corporation lacked standing to bring
quiet title action as to patented mining claims
because, in view of articles of dissolution
which indicated that corporation had been
dissolved and had completed winding-up process, corporation was no longer eligible to
sue or be sued for purpose of winding up its
affairs. U.C.A.1953, 16-10-101 (Repealed).

Robert C. Cummings and Michael D. Cummings, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Derek Langton, Salt Lake City, for Appellees Jensen.

SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COMPANY,
a Utah corporation, Plaintiff and
Appellant,

Wilford N. Hansen, Jr., Payson, for Corporate Appellee and Appellee Killion.
Before BILLINGS, GREENWOOD and
JACKSON, JJ.

v.
WILFORD H. HANSEN STONE QUARRIES, INC., a Utah corporation; Sharron Killion; James T. Jensen; Jerry J.
Jensen; Dix Jensen; and all other persons unknown claiming any right, title,
estate or interest in or lien upon the real
property described in the pleading adverse to the plaintiffs ownership, or
clouding its title thereto, Defendants
and Appellees.
No. 950705-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Oct. 31, 1996.

Corporation brought action seeking to
quiet title to three patented mining claims.
The District Court, Fourth District, Provo
Department, Lynn W. Davis, J., granted
summary judgment for defendants, and corporation appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Jackson, J., held that corporation lacked
standing to pursue action because it had been

OPINION
JACKSON, Judge:
Salt Lake Investment Company (SLI)
challenges the trial court's summary judgment for Wilford H. Hansen Stone Quarries,
Inc., Sharron Killion, James T. Jensen, Jerry
J. Jensen, and Dix Jensen (collectively, Jensens). We affirm.
FACTS
During the summer of 1965, SLFs board of
directors and shareholders agreed to dissolve
SLI. The undisputed documents in the record show SLI then proceeded according to
the statutory scheme applicable in 1965. See
Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10-79 to—82, S7 to 88 (1962) (repealed 1992). In October 1965,
SLI filed with the secretary of state a statement of intent to dissolve the corporation.
Sec id. § 16-10-79 (repealed 1992). SLI received a tax clearance from the state tax
coiamission, which was filed with the secretary of state in December 1965. See id.

SALT LAKE INV. v. HANSEN STONE QUARRIES
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§ lfi-10-80 (repealed 1992). Finally, on December 30, 19G5, SLI filed with the secretary
of state its articles of dissolution. See id.
§§ 16-10-87, -88 (repealed 1992).

States Tel & Tel Co. v. Garfield County, 811
P.2d 184, 192 (Utah 1991).

Summary judgment is proper only if no
genuine issues of material fact exist and the
movant is "entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law." Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c). We view the
facts from a perspective favoring the losing
party and review the trial court's summary
judgment ruling for correctness, according
no deference to its conclusions. Mountain

SLI has not disputed the accuracy of its
articles of dissolution which read in pertinent
part:
THIRD: All debts, obligations and liabilities of the corporation have been paid
and discharged, or adequate provision has
been made therefor.
FOURTH: All remaining property and
assets of the corporation have been distributed among its shareholders, in accordance
with their respective rights and interests.
FIFTH: There are no suits pending
against the corporation in any court in
respect of which adequate provision has
not been made for the satisfaction of any
judgment, order or decree which may be
entered against it.
See Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-87 (1962) (repealed 1992) (outlining content of articles of
dissolution). The articles thus assert that
SLI completed a textbook winding-up process.3 See 8 Zolman Cavitch, Business Organizations § 189.02, at 189-9 (1992) (outlining
wind-up activities); see also Model Business
Corp. Act Ann. § 14.03 annot. hist. (Supp.
1996) (noting under version of act existing in
1965 corporations "filed articles of dissolution
when the winding-up process was completed"). Consequently, under the former statute, having already wound up, SLI is no
longer eligible to sue or be sued "for the
purpose of winding up its affairs," Utah Code
Ann. § 16-10-101 (1962) (repealed 1992).4

1. Actually, SLI's two former shareholders initiated this suit in SLI's name.

address them. See State v. Carter, lib P.2d 886,
888-89 (Utah 1989).

Almost thirty years later, in October 1994,
SLI brought suit against Jensens, seeking to
quiet title to three patented mining claims,1
Jensens moved for summary judgment on
the basis that SLI had no standing to sue
because it had dissolved and wound up its
affairs. The trial court granted summary
judgment for Jensens, determining "30 years
is far beyond a reasonable time to wind-up
the activities of a corporation," under section
16-10-101 of the Utah Code, which allowed a
dissolved corporation to "sue and be sued"
only "for the purpose of winding up its affairs in respect to any property and assets
which have not been distributed or otherwise
disposed of prior to . . . dissolution," id.
§ 16-10-101 (repealed 1992). SLI attacks
the trial court's ruling, arguing it has the
right to sue under section 16-10-101 because
the quiet title action is part of its winding up
process.2
ANALYSIS

2.

SLI also raises the issue of whether it is dissolved, but states in its brief "that dissolution is
irrelevant on the issue of its right to sue and be
sued." Because SLI's right to sue and be sued is
really the sole issue in this case, and SLI has not
explained how the question of its dissolution
relates to that issue, we do not address the dissolution issue. Our analysis assumes SLI was dissolved on December 30, 1965, as certified by the
Utah Division of Corporations and Commercial
Code.
SLI further challenges the trial court's denial
of its requests for oral argument on the summary
judgment motion and for permission to add Evelyn P. Boyce and Lois P. Connell as individual
plaintiffs. We have reviewed these issues and
conclude they are meritless; thus, we decline to

3.

Not until pressed at oral argument did SLI give
an explanation for its current conduct, which
appears to contradict its articles of dissolution.
There, SLI finally offered the excuse that it had
merely forgotten about the mining claims at issue
here and had not actually distributed them as
stated in its articles.

4.

SLI worries about the disposition of property
in this and similar cases in which a dissolved
corporation may remain in an uncertain chain of
title, yet has no standing to resolve that issue.
However compelling that question may be, it is
not before us at this time. Our narrow holding
is that, in this case, SLI has no standing to sue to
quiet title to the mining claims involved. Other
corporations and individuals concerned about
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We therefore conclude the trial court correctly ruled that because SLl's winding-up
period was over it could no longer sue or be
sued. Accordingly, we affirm.

1. Adoption 0»15

BILLINGS, J., concurs.

Father failed to preserve claim that trial
court applied improper legal standard in terminating parental rights, where he supported
application of that statutory standard at trial.
U.C.A.1953, 78-3a-407; 78-3Q-5 (Repealed).

GREENWOOD, J., concurs in result only.

2. Appeal and Error <£=>882(1)

(o
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Appellant cannot both wholeheartedly
support application of given statute at trial
and then on appeal claim that court's application of that same statute was error.
3. Infants <3>196

In the Matter of the ADOPTION
OF B.O., a minor.
P.O., Appellant,
v.
S.G. and C.G., Appellees.
No. 960010-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Oct. 31, 1996.

In adoption case, the Third District
Court, Salt Lake Department, Leslie A. Lewis, J., terminated father's parental rights for
failing to conduct more than token efforts to
support or communicate with child. Father
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Davis, Associate P.J., held that: (1) as matter of first
impression, statute permitting termination of
parental rights for failure to conduct more
than token efforts to support or communicate
with child is constitutional; (2) district court
had concurrent jurisdiction with juvenile
court; and (3) father's letters, gifts, and telephone calls rarely exceeding two instances
per year could be found to be only token
efforts.
Affirmed.
the title to the claims here must simply pursue
their own remedies, supported by whatever other

District court has concurrent jurisdiction
with juvenile court over termination of parental rights for failure to conduct more than
token efforts to support or communicate with
child, abandonment, neglect or abuse, unfitness or incompetence, care of child in out-ofhome placement, failure of parental adjustment, voluntary relinquishment of rights, or
failure to give proper parental care and protection.
U.C.A.1953, 78-3a-407, 78-3a104(l)(e), 78-30-4.16(l)(b).
4. Infants <3=>248.1
Simple reiteration of facts supporting
position does not satisfy obligation to marshal all evidence supporting challenged findings for termination of parental rights and
then to show clear lack of support despite the
evidence.
5. Adoption <3=>7.4(1, 6)
Father's contact with child primarily in
form of letters, gifts, and telephone calls
rarely exceeding two instances' per year
could be found to be "token efforts" supporting termination of parental rights, despite
trial court's use of abandonment analysis;
correspondence for Christmas and birthday
often arrived after event had passed, and
father was substantially in arrears of modest
child support obligation. U.C.A.19f>3, 7S-3a407(6)(a).
Sec publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and definitions.
legal theories may apply,

FILED
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
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Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Jackson.

JACKSON, Judge:
Salt Lake Investment Company (SLI) challenges the trial
court's summary judgment for Wilford H. Hansen Stone Quarries,
Inc., Sharron Killion, James T. Jensen, Jerry J. Jensen, and Dix
Jensen (collectively, Jensens). We affirm.

FACTS
During the summer of 1965, SLIfs board of directors and
shareholders agreed to dissolve SLI. The undi.: ?uted documents in
the record show SLI then proceeded according tc the statutory
scheme applicable in 1965. See Utah Code Ann. ^§ 16-10-79 to 82, -87 to -88 (1962) (repealed 1992). In Octc*:ar 1965, SLI
filed with the secretary of state a statement or intent to
dissolve the corporation. See id. § 16-10-79 (repealed 1992).
SLI received a tax clearance from the state tax commission, which
was filed with the secretary of state in December 1965. See iii^.
§ 16-10-80 (repealed 1992). Finally, on December 30, 1965, SLI
filed with the secretary of state its articles of dissolution.
S££L iil*. §§ 16-10-87, -88 (repealed 1992).
Almost thirty years later, in October 1994, SLI brought suit
against1 Jensens, seeking to quiet title to three patented mining
claims. Jensens iroved for summary judgment on the basis that
SLI had no standing to sue because it had dissolved and wound up
its affairs. The crial court granted summary judgment for
Jensens, determining "30 years is far beyond a reasonable time t6
wind-up the activities of a corporation," under section 16-10-101
of the Utah Code, which allowed a dissolved corporation to "sue
and be sued" only "for the purpose of winding up its affairs in
respect to any property and assets' which have not been
distributed or otherwise disposed of prior to . . . dissolution,"
id. § 16-10-101 (repealed 1992). SLI attacks the trial court's
ruling, arguing it has the right to sue under section 16-10-101
because the quiet title action is part of its winding up
process.2

1. Actually, SLIfs two former shareholders initiated this suit
in SLI's name.
2. SLI also raises the issue of whether it is dissolved, but
states in its brief "that dissolution is irrelevant on the issue
of its right to sue and be sued." Because SLI's right to sue and
be sued is really the sole issue in this case, and SLI has not
explainednho*|^to^
relates^to^ that,
issued we do not address the'dissolution issue. Our analysis
assumes SLI was dissolved on December 30, 1965,,»,*as>,certified by
the Utah Division'of Corporations and Commercial7Code.
SLI further challenges the trial court's denial of its
requests for oral argument on the summary judgment motion and for
permission to add Evelyn P. Boyce and Lois P. Connell as
individual plaintiffs. We have reviewed these issues and
conclude they are meritless; thus, we decline to address them.
See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888-89 (Utah 1989).

950705-CA
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ANALYSIS
Summary judgment is proper only if no genuine issues of
material fact exist and the movant is "entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). We view the facts from
a perspective favoring the losing party and review the trial
court's summary judgment ruling for correctnessf according no
deference to its conclusions. Mountain States Tel. & Tel» CQ» VO,
Garfield County, 811 P.2d 184, 192 (Utah 1991).
SLI has not disputed the accuracy of its., articles of
dissolution which^read impertinent part:
THIRD: All debts, obligations and
liabilities of the corporation have been paid
and discharged, or adequate provision has
been made therefor.
FOURTH: All remaining property and
assets of the corporation have been
distributed among its shareholders, in
accordance with their respective rights and
interests.
FIFTH: There are no suits pending
against the corporation in any court in
respect of which adequate provision has not
been made for the satisfaction of any
judgment, order or decree which may be
entered against it.
See Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-87 (1962) (repealed 1992) (outlining
content of articles of dissolution). The articles thus assert
that SLI completed a textbook winding-up process.3 See 8 Zolman
Cavitch, Business Organizations § 189.02, at 189-9 (1992)
(outlining wind-up activities); see also Model Business Corp. Act
Ann. § 14.03 annot. hist. (Supp. 1996) (noting under version of
act existing in 1965 corporations "filed articles of dissolution
when the winding-up process was completed"). Consequently, under
the former statute, having already wound up, SLI is no longer

3. Not until pressed "at oral argument did SLI give an explanation for its current conduct, which appears to contradict
its articles of dissolution. There, SLI finally offered the
excuse that it had;merely forgotten about the^mining claims at
issue here and had not actually distributed them'as stated in its
articles.

950705-CA
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eligible to^sue.or be sued ,ffor the purpose of winding up its4
affairs," Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-101 (1962) (repealed 1992).
*Je therefore conclude the trial court correctly ruled that
because SLI's winding-up period was over it could no longer sue
or be sued"! SCcur difig^y-7—we-a^g-f-irm-: •

N4rman H. Jacksofff; Judge

I CONCUR:

fudith M. Billings, Judge1

I CONCUR I1T RESULT ONLYt

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

4. SLI worries about the disposition of property in this and
similar cases in which a dissolved corporation may remain in an
uncertain chain of^title, yet has no standing to resolve that
issue. However compellingrthatrquestion may^be^it is-not before
us at>this***time. Our narrow holding is that, in this case, SLI
has no standing to sue to quiet title to the mining claims
involved. Other corporations and individuals concerned about the
title to the claims here must simply pursue their own remedies,
supported by whatever other legal theories may apply.

950705-CA
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This matter is before the court upon appellant's petition
for rehearing, filed November 14, 1996.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for rehearing is
denied.
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Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
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THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
WILFORD H. HANSEN STONE
QUARRIES, INC., a Utah Corporation,
SHARRON KILLION, JAMES T. JENSEN,
JERRY J. JENSEN, DIX JENSEN, and all
other persons unknown, claiming any right,
title, estate or interest in, or lien upon the
real property described in the pleading
adverse to the Plaintiffs-ownership, or
clouding its title thereto,

CASE NO. 940400611
DATE: March 27, 1995
JUDGE: LYNN W. DAVIS

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on Defendants' (James, Jerry, and Dix Jensen)
Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, for Summary Judgment. Defendants, represented by
Derek Langton, filed memoranda in support of the motion. Plaintiff, represented by Robert C.
Cummings, filed memoranda in opposition to the motion. Both Plaintiff and Defendants have
submitted documents outside of the pleadings, and therefore, the Court considers the motion
as a motion for summary judgment. The Court, after carefully considering the memoranda
and other documents submitted to the Court, now enters the following:
RULING
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE

000
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According to the records of the Department of Commerce of the State of Utah, the
Salt Lake Investment Company filed Articles of Incorporation on February 19, 1955,
Statement of Intent to Dissolve on October 22, 1965, and Articles of Dissolution on
December 30, 1965. The Department of Commerce was unable to determine whether or not a
Certificate of Dissolution was issued, but certified that the corporation was voluntarily
dissolved on December 30, 1965.
The Articles of Dissolution signed by Evelyn P. Boyce and Laron A. Boyce affirm
that all debts, obligations and liabilities of the corporation have been discharged and that all
property and assets of the corporation have been distributed among its shareholders. There
has been no evidence of any activity whatsoever of the Salt Lake Investment Company for
nearly 30 years; no business transacted, no filing of tax returns, etc. However, on October
24, 1994, this action was filed by Salt Lake Investment Company to quiet title to a patented
mining claim.
IL
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, admissions, together with the affidavits present no genuine issue as to any
material fact. Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Evidence which is in dispute

should be interpreted in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Kirberg v. West
One Bank, 872 P,2d 39, 40-41 (Utah App. 1994); Higgins v. Salt Lake City, 855 P.2d 231,
233 (Utah 1993).

000
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III MelVinli i l'i1

i in i nn I mi ill i h I in mi'..I Il I il I in in in in1. 1 I in. in I I Iiiiiiiiir, "Sliilll Lake Investment Company,

is a dissolved corporation which does not have standing to sue or be sued. In response,
I'ljiiilil'l iiissetts I I in. ii Hide corporation was not dissolved because an actual Certificate of
Dissolution cannot be located. However, the Court finds that based upon the filin*
Notice of Intent to Dissolve and of Articles of Dissolution with the Department of Commerce,
that the Department properly determined that
dissolved. Even if the Court were to deem the inability of the Department to locate a
conclusion that the corporation was not dissolved
on December 30, 1965, the Court finds that thirty years of total inactivity together with the
other filings is sufficient to find a defacto dissolution.
Plaintiffs next argument is that even if the corporation is dissolved 1 llnh slitduriniiy !,in\
in effect in 1965 as well as the present allows a corporation to sue and be sued after
i

dissolution as part of the windn
(1953 as amended in 1992); U.i -\ v

!

i in lotated § 16 10a 1 «- 105

;< • - (in effect in 1965). This Court finds that 30

i (Mir mi I'll bn I i mimii I i in1 i1 iiiiiii ilhllli I I I I mi In

mimiI i I I ni |i I I II in Ii iillips ul i corporation. Nearly every

single statute of limitations would have run in such a time, records have certainly been lost,
memories faded, and defendants would certainly be prejudiced by allowing a corporation to
sue under the "winding-up" exception thirty years after dissolution.

Therefore, the r'nyii fmrk

that Plaintiff Salt Lake Investment Company has no standing to sue or be sued in Utah courts,
and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgme

ooo
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Each party has requested oral arguments in this matter. However, the Court finds
Plaintiffs opposition to the motion to be frivolous, and therefore, declines to hear oral
arguments on the motion pursuant to Rule 4-501(3)(c).
Counsel for Defendants is instructed to prepare an order of dismissal of all claims
consistent with this ruling, and the file shall be closed.

Dated at Provo, Utah, this 27th day of March, 1995.
BY THE COURT

?

-—7

»

•

•

7

Judge Lynn W, Davis
cc:

Derek Langton, Esq.
Robert C. Cummings, Esq.
Wilford N. Hansen, Jr., Esq.
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DEREK LANGTON (4 068)
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for defendants James T. Jensen,
Jerry J. Jensen and Dix Jensen
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 0898
Telephone: (801 ) 532 -1234
'IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL I1 f .STRICT » UUNT '»F "HAH COUNT,1
STATE OF UTAH

THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COM
PANY, a Utah corporation,

ORDER GRANTING JENSEN DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaint' iff,
vs.
WILFORD H. HANSEN STONE QUARRIES, INC., a Utah corporation, SHARRON KILLION, JAMES
T. JENSEN, JERRY J. JENSEN,
DIX JENSEN, and all other
persons unknown, claiming anyright, title, estate or interest in, or lien upon the real
property described in the
pleading adverse to the plain™
tiff's ownership, or clouding
its title thereto,

Civil

-^

94^4 00^1

J u d g e 1 iyuri W

Davi,

Defendants.
*

The
il . L . - - .
Jensen

Jei •

Motion

*

* *:m

* • .-d December.

*

*

*

•

- 1 y,,

~
- <t

.1 , Jensen and Dix Jenser

Defendants") regularl
162037

*

' -^

; •'• ' . >~

; ;,:

1; or

Summary

defendants James

>r^inafter

Lhe

I.

"Jensen

:^< * Lb'ion .

OOf-

Because

184

both

Plaintiff

and

the

Jensen

Defendants

submitted

documents

outside of the pleadings for the Court's consideration, the Court
accordingly treats the Motion as one for summary judgment pursuant
to Rules 12(b) and 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
After full consideration of the memoranda, papers and
documents

submitted by Plaintiff

and the Jensen Defendants

in

support of and in opposition to the subject Motion, the Court
issued its Ruling on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, for Summary Judgment, dated March 27, 1995.

In its Ruling, the

Court determined, based on the undisputed facts, that the Salt Lake
Investment Company was a corporation that was dissolved in 1965,
and that said corporation therefore lacks standing to sue or be
sued in Utah courts.

Accordingly,

It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED

that

the

Jensen Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, for Summary

162037

-2-

000
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J'
tifl: s Complaint shal- - •- .i;_ s i

* ei.y are dismissed w;.ih pr-M; i,

DATED this Z 7 day of /Up\/

L-~ , ,1995.

El ! ! THE COURT:/

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

ROBERT C. CUMMINGS
Attorney for plaintiff

162037

-3-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this _/

day of April, 1995, I

caused to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING JENSEN DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, to:
Robert C. Cummings
225 South 200 East, #150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Wilford N. Hansen, Jr.
HANSEN & MAUGHAN
Mountain'View East Professional Plaza
1172 East Highway 6, Suite 7
P.O. Box 67
Payson, Utah 84651-0067

162037

-4-

000
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,

RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO ALTER AND
AMEND JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

CASE: 940400611

vs.

EILFORD H. HANSEN STONE
QUARRIES, INC. a Utah corporation,
SHARON KILLION, JAMES T. JENSEN,
JERRY J. JENSEN, DIX JENSEN, and all
other persons unknown, claiming any right,
title, estate or interest in, or lien upon the
real property described in the pleading
adverse to the plaintiffs ownership, or
clouding it's title thereto,

JUDGE: LYNN W. DAVIS

Defendants.
This matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion to Alter and Amend Judgment
pursuant to Rule 59(e), URCP. Plaintiff filed a Memorandum of Points & Authorities in
Support of its motion with Defendant1 '• I«M" ,i Memnnml'ii" "i ' »pP<,s''"1" '" 'I1'' m i'l" iM
Plaintiff also filed a Reply Memorandum. The Court after carefully considering the

RULING
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
On Mar*
filed by Plaintm aait 1

-iirt upon motion of Defendants, Dismissed the complaint
Mlo

ourt iou;

onn

-3;

/

that Plaintiff Corporation had dissolved, either de jure or de facto, nearly thirty years prior to
the commencement of the action. Based on this finding the Court applied Utah law in effect
in 1965, the year of dissolution, and determined that there was no legal basis for the suit to
proceed.
Plaintiff now requests that the judgment be altered or amended due to plain error in
applying the law.
II.
ISSUE PRESENTED
Is the Order to Dismiss based on a faulty application of statutory law?

m.
DISCUSSION
In reviewing the file the Court found that the Order signed by the Court is titled Order
Granting Jensen Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. However, a plain reading of the
Order clearly indicates that the case was dismissed for lack of standing. The Court believes
that such a drafting error is a harmless error and not grounds for attacking the decision.
Plaintiff does not in fact raise this issue in its pleading and while referring to the Order as a
Summary Judgment Order, the arguments presented deal with the issues of standing and the
dismissal of the action.
Nothing in the memoranda filed with the Court persuades this Court that the judgment
should be altered or amended. Plaintiff corporation filed an intent with the State of Utah to
dissolve and according to the Articles of Dissolution filed with the State and signed by the

officers of the corporation

\ 11 remaining property and assets of the corporation have been

distributed among its shareholders, in accordance with their respective rights and interests."
Articles of Dissolution Fourth paragraph dated December 29, 1965 and filed with the State on

r >»111] 111 (i (i i n i" J 11' i

riii

r»111111»11' t (11 (* 111111 mi I ni 11111

I mi ni I mi ni 11 11111111111 111 mi ni 11 1111 () 1111111111 mi 11

exert P . action showing ownership or control over this property during the nearly thirty
year

mding of defacto dissolution and the lack of

standing to bring the action. This Court is ilot persuaded by the cases relied upon by Plaintiff
in argument

In Falconaero Enterprise. Inc. v. Valley Investment Company. 395 P.2d

>1C

(Utah 1964), there are insufficient facts detailed to determine whether the acceptance

e

statutory wording of Title 16-10-100 and 16-10-101, 'in erf^cf !r 1965 but repealed in 1992),
relied upon in that case by that court .

'lacka^_&. Ki.obel

Enterprises. Inc. v. Teton Van Gas. Inc.. 460 P.2d 828 (Utah), the court used the statutory
pro\

isioih (it Iiili> hi in inn iiiil In Hi lull in nulojji/e in a i J« i nlieic llu' iorporation

powers had been suspended by the state. Neither of these cases provide substantial support
for the arguments set foith by IMaintill
M.

r 0

DECISION
This Court declines to disturb the prior dciisinn

In In hi nl' I he jiliinc

IIIM.II MUM

iln

Court finds Plaintiffs request for oral argument on this motion unnecessary.
//
//

ooo

;j;n

THEREFORE,
(1)

Plaintiffs request for oral argument is denied pursuant to Rule 4-501 (3)(c)
UJA.

(2)

Plaintiffs motion to alter or amend judgment is denied.

Dated at Provo, Utah, this J_ day of A//l^

. 1995.

BY THE COURT

cc:

Robert C. Cummings, Esq.
Derek Langton, Esq.

A

000

2

and the sa i d counterclaim

of the Corporate Defendant

and of

defendant Kill ion are dismissed with prejudice, and the said cross
I li

i i u* p u n l i i c

il if* 1; P I M.I .in in!

i i i ! il

I

I lletendant

dismissed without prejudice^ and It is adjudged that
my kind are reserved for 1 ater determinati on by
I :i ii s p o s e ci o f • a ] 11

<£3

DATED the

-

••

s

K : ". I "on

o :laims of
. - Court, the

a J ] par ti es .

day of September. 199S.
9

CO\$RT JUDGE

/ ^ ^ ^

^

^

^

^

^

^

^

;

^ ^ -

is

f

MAILING CERTIFICATE
A copy of the foregoing proposed Supplemental Order was
mailed to Derek Langton, attorney for defendants Jensen, at his
address,

P. 0. Box 45898, Salt Lake City, Utah

84145-0898, and a

copy was mailed to Wilford N. Hansen, Jr., attorney for the
Corporate Defendant and for Sharron Killion, at his address, P. O.
Box 67, Payson, Utah
"2 y

84651-0067, all postage prepaid, this

day of September, 1995.

(JUA- ^

&

Attorney for the Plaintiff

-4-

ROBERT C. CUMMINGS, #777
Attorney for t h e Plaintiffs
225 South 200 East, #150
Salt Lake City r Utah
8*
Te1ephone: 322-114 ]
DISTRICT COURT IN A N D FOR
UTAH COUNT
THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COMPANY,
A Utah Corporation,
Plaintiff,

)
)

)

COMPLAINT

V5.i
W I L F 0 R D

H^

H A N S E N

ST()NE

}

QUARRIES, INC., A Utah
)
corporation, SHARRON KILLION,
JAMES T. JENSEN, JERRY J. JENSEN, )
DIX JENSEN, and all other persons
unknown, claiming any right,
)
title, estate or interest ii i, • : i :
lien upon the real property
)
described in the pleading adverse
to t h e plaintiff's ownership, or
)
clouding its title thereto,
Defendants,,

, ,..

#/(j/ttk//

U.J.J-

)

The plaintiff complains of the defendants and for < .nise
of iction alleges as follows:
rin'H^ plaintiff I s a Utah corporation sometimes known
and designated

c Offi ce ' sf the I J t ::::!: :; Seer e tar i' • ::;f State (a: id

successors) as Corporate File No 30474
."" ,
entitled

"' 1111" 111 a i n t i f £

is the owner

to possession of a certain real

s imple and

y

situate in Utah County, Utah, and more particularly described as

000
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AMIS NO. 1 PLACER, a patented mining claim being Patent
Mineral Survey No. 4224, and being a part of Sections 35
and 36, Township 11 South, Range 9 East, SLB&M.
(Containing approximately 17.466 acres.)
3.

The defendants assert and claim an interest in and

to the above-described Property which is adverse to and which
constitutes a cloud upon the title of the plaintiff to said
Property.
4.

The claim asserted by the defendants is without any

right whatsoever, and the said defendants have no estate, right,
title or interest in, or lien upon, said Property or any part
thereof.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment as follows:
1.

That the defendants be required to set forth the

nature and extent of their claims to said Property, that all
adverse claims of the defendants be determined by decree of this
court and that in said decree it be ordered, adjudged and decreed
as follows:
A.

That the plaintiff is the owner in fee simple

and entitled to possession of the aforesaid Property as against the
defendants, and that the title to the Property, and the whole
thereof, be quieted in the plaintiff and against the defendants.
B.

That the defendants and any and all persons, if

any, claiming by, through or under defendants have no right, title
or interest in, or lien upon, the above-described Property, or any
part thereof; that any and all adverse claims of the defendants be
-2nn A

4

d e c l a r e d mi I I and void and

rurther force and e f f e c t ; a n d

:

the d e f e n d a n t s a n d a l l persons

i ? a n y , claiming b y , t h r o u g h o r

u n d e r said d e f e n d a n t s be forever enjoined, debarred a n d restrained
from a s s e r t i n g a n y cl aim or interest whatsoever in o r t o t h e said
P r o p e r t y h e r e i n described adverse t o t h e ownership and t i t l e of t h e
p I a i n t 1 I" 1

1 ill

iini! Il I

ni mi ill! I"i o p e i I, y I'm

i I i iiuiill ni i l l ) |p 1 1 mi m l ni 1 II "

1 i I 1e

thereto.
(

r>* olaintiff b e awarded such further a n d

ciMijil i I j una 1 i m]
D

F or costs and for such other relief a s I s ji ist

to b e granted in t h e p r e m i s e s .
SECOI ID CJ a JSE OF i id, IOI i

The plaintiff complains of the* defendants, Wilford H
Hansen

Stone

i'pfen Mil II

Quarries , Inc. and Sharron Ki ] 1 ion

(hereinafter

is

I

for cause of action alleges as follows:
1.

T h e plaintiff is a I Jtah corporation sometimes k n o w n
il in I h v Of. t ice c: f t h e

arid designated

• -t:ary o f State (and

successors) a s Corporate File N o . 30474.
2.

T h e plaintiff

€

is

"• "

("Property1

situate

t h e owner

ei: ta I l I

* • •

simple a n d
r

I ract

County, Utah, more

particularly

described as follows:
Tract
PHILIPPINE

MINE LODE,

.

patented

mining

cl a i m

being

000

Patent Mineral Survey No. 5874, and being part of Section
25, Township 6 South, Range 1 West, SLB&M. (Containing
approximately 20.661 acres.)
Tract No. 2:
B, Bl, B2, B3, B4, and B5 LODE, a group of patented
mining claims being Patent Mineral Survey No. 6866, and
being part of Sections 35 and 36, Township 9 South, Range
3 West, SLB&M. (Containing approximately 121.955 acres.)
3.

The Defendants assert and claim an interest in and

to the above-described Property which is adverse to and which
constitutes a cloud upon the title of the plaintiff to said
Property.
4.

Th£ claim asserted by the Defendants is without any

right whatsoever, and the said Defendants have no estate, right,
title or interest in, or lien upon, said Property or any part
thereof.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment as follows:
1.

That the Defendants be required to set forth the

nature and extent of their claims to said Property, that all
adverse claims of the Defendants be determined by decree of this
court, and that in said decree it be ordered, adjudged and decreed
as follows:
A.

That the plaintiff is the owner in fee simple

and entitled to possession of the aforesaid Property as against the
Defendants, and that the title to the said Property, and the whole
thereof, be quieted in the plaintiff and against the Defendants.
B.

That the Defendants and any and all persons, if
-4-

000

any, claiming by, through or i it iciei: Defendants have no right, title
or i nterest in,
p

..

U L G U U,

.

:::)! i the above-described Property

/

^nv and a] 1 adverse claims of the Defendants be

declared null and void and of no further force and effect; and that
the Defendants a nil «i il II persons, i f ai i/y

claimin

throua

under said Defendants be forever enjoined, debarred .. *- restrained
from asserting any claim, or Interest whatsoever

:ii n or to the

Property herp
plaint

t:i tJ <a • : (I: bh 2

. .

;, v i n J ropert f <

,

louding plaintiff's title

thereto,
C.

That the p] a i 1 iti f f t •€ aw ai: ded si :icl: 1 fi lr bher an: 1 1

additional relief as to the coin: t may seem just and proper.
D*
1

' For costs and for such other relief as is just
ses.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

The plaintiff complains of the defendants, Wilforci H
I , .

r e f e r r e d t o as "Defendants" i i 1 t h i s Second Cause of Acti on) , and
for cause of action, a l l e g e s as fo] ] ows:
1.

•

Till: 11

it" I I I

.11 lb >pl .! 5 I ,1 :IL

Cause of Action,
2.
IPfl* f I I" 1 'I

The Defendants
I

II

Ii» l ( ' M M M *» 1

have

removed

stone,

or

< 1 1 I If

other
'"It O f U " l

from said Property without authorization from the plaintiff.
3.

The plaintiff has been damaged by such unauthorized
5

000

removal of Stone in an amount not now known to plaintiff, and
discovery will be necessary to ascertain the full extent of said
damages.
WHEREFORE,

plaintiff

prays

for

judgment

against

Defendants for damages for the reasonable value of the Stone thus
removed from the property, as proved at trial, together with
interest and costs, and for such other relief as is just to be
granted in the premises.

'L/rf^
4

ROBERT C. CUMMINGS
Attorney for the Plaintiff

-6-
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ROBERT C. CUMMINGS, #777
Attorney for t h e Plaintiff
225 South 200 East, #150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone
322-1141

!/)

III! Till' I HI IRTI II .Mill I *M A

DISTRICT COURT

UTAH COUNTY, STAT
THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COMPANY,
A Utah corporation,

TAH

)

Plaintiff,
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER
CONFIRMING DISMISSAL OF
ALL CLAIMS

vs.

HANSEN* ST oNE

W I L F 0 R D H>

Q U A R R I E S , I N C . , a Utah
Corporation, SHARRON KILLION
JAMES T. JENSEN, JERRY J, JENSEN,
DIX JENSEN, and all other persons
unknot i 1, claiming any right,
title, estate or interest in
lien upon the real property
described in the pleading adverse
to the plaintiff's ownership, or
clouding its title thereto,

Civil N o . 940400611
Judge Lynn W, Davis

Defendants.
Pursuant to notice, a conference was hPld the ,1]i\h
September, 1Q 0 c>, between the c «..rt mi
whprr'in

I il parties threw'?,1

•

*

plaintiff,

Derek

-

~*v- *

<l<%f finlant •.

Jensen

(hereinafter
appearing
yua J:' r j e s

I.angton

"defendants

< ; attorney

Jensen"),
* -

:

p d r n e s through counsel,

Court and other counsel; i-^i>.:
fot

iJa,

o m m u n i c a t m n * «' ti the
•/

. •i
appearir i as
,

":if •••

attorney L O T

--* s

Jensen

.iiinlli W L J I O H I III

defendants, Wilford

!I

Hansen

11 f w i * i n.i 1 ' »• r

Stone
" Corporate

Defendant"), and Sharron Killion (hereinafter "Killion"), and in
said conference the Court considered the matter of the finality of
the Order heretofore entered herein on the 27th day of April, 1995,
entitled "Order Granting Jensen Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment" and the court having hearing the arguments of counsel and
having duly considered said matter, and whereas the Court intended
in and by said order of April 27, 1995, to dismiss all claims in
this action and not just those of the plaintiff, and whereas the
Court desires by this Supplemental Order to remove any ambiguity as
to the Court's said intention which may exist by reason of the
wording of said order of April 27, 1995,
NOW THEREFORE UPON THE COURT'S OWN MOTION IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.
complaint;
defendant

The claims
(2)

in this action are

counterclaim

of

the

Corporate

Killion against plaintiff; and

(1) plaintiff
Defendant

(3) cross claim of

Corporate Defendant and defendant Killion against
Defendants".

and

"the other

That the aforesaid Order entered on April 27, 1995,

was intended as a dismissal of all claims in this action, as
follows, to-wit: consistent with the Court's ruling that plaintiff
cannot sue or be sued, the said complaint and the said counterclaim
were intended to be dismissed with prejudice, and the intent of the
Court was to dismiss the said cross claim without prejudice.
2.

In ratification and confirmation of such intention,

it is hereby declared and adjudged that plaintiff's said complaint
-2-

DEREK LANGTON (4068)
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for defendants James T. Jensen,
Jerry J. Jensen and Dix Jensen
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP UTAH COUNTY
STATE OP UTAH
* * * * * * *

THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

MOTION TO DISMISS, OR ALTERNATIVELY, FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

vs.
WILFORD H. HANSEN STONE QUARRIES, INC., a Utah corporation, SHARRON KILLION, JAMES
T. JENSEN, JERRY J. JENSEN,
DIX JENSEN, and all other
persons unknown, claiming anyright, title, estate or interest in, or lien upon the real
property described in the
pleading adverse to the plaintiff's ownership, or clouding
its title thereto,

Civil No. 940400611
Judge Lynn W. Davis

Defendants.
* * * * * * *

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, defendants James T. Jensen, Jerry J. Jensen and Dix
Jensen (hereinafter the "Jensen Defendants") hereby respectfully
move the Court for an Order dismissing the plaintiff's Complaint
146749

000

with prejudice as against said Jensen Defendants for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted on the grounds that
(1) plaintiff

was

a

Utah

corporation

which

was

voluntarily

dissolved in 1965, and which therefore no longer exists, (2)
plaintiff's

sole

remaining

former

shareholders, who

are

the

individuals purporting to act on behalf of the corporate plaintiff
in bringing the present action, previously quit-claimed their
interests, if any, in the Amis No. 1 placer mining claim to the
Jensen Defendants.
Alternatively,

because

the

Jensen

Defendants

are

submitting certain documents in support of this Motion, this Motion
can properly be treated as a motion for summary judgment pursuant
to Rules 12(b) and 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
This

Motion

is

further

based

on

the

accompanying

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support hereof.
DATED this 30^day

of December, 1994.
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER

^y^^/^ui
)EREK LANGTOI
Attorneys for defendants James
T. Jensen, Jerry J. Jensen
and Dix Jensen

146749
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 20

day of December, 199A,

I caused to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS, OR ALTERNATIVELY,
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, to:
Robert C. Cummings
225 South 200 East, #150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
y

kO\jJr\aAA^
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